Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0915-2zbMath1392.91056OpenAlexW2135385181MaRDI QIDQ2362193

Vikram Manjunath, Eun Jeong Heo

Publication date: 6 July 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0915-2

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstochastic dominancepreference profilelottery selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Cites Work

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