Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games
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Publication:2391868
DOI10.1007/s00186-013-0433-xzbMath1271.91026OpenAlexW2090860674MaRDI QIDQ2391868
Publication date: 5 August 2013
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0433-x
Related Items (5)
Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games ⋮ Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames ⋮ FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES
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