Aggregate comparative statics

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.009zbMath1281.91011OpenAlexW3124789100MaRDI QIDQ2436295

Martin Kaae Jensen, Daron Acemoglu

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63294

zbMATH Keywords

aggregative gamespublic good provisioncontestscomparative staticsCournot modelstrategic substitutespatent racesnice games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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