Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
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Publication:2469856
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.010zbMath1132.91533OpenAlexW2061873814MaRDI QIDQ2469856
Publication date: 11 February 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.010
Related Items
Efficient extensions of communication values ⋮ Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games ⋮ A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions ⋮ Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value ⋮ A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games ⋮ Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions ⋮ Tree solutions and standardness for cycle-free graph games ⋮ A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games ⋮ Probabilistic network values ⋮ Smooth multibidding mechanisms ⋮ Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures ⋮ An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes ⋮ Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms ⋮ A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value
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