Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.002zbMath1318.91094OpenAlexW2079025269MaRDI QIDQ2516250

Azarakhsh Malekian, Robert D. Kleinberg, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date: 12 August 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityalgorithmic mechanism designBayesian mechanism designmulti-dimensional preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (8)

Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings ⋮ Computer-Aided Verification for Mechanism Design ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011 ⋮ Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ The Complexity of Contracts ⋮ On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The complexity of computing the permanent
• A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming
• On optimal matchings
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Matching random samples in many dimensions
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Optimal Random Matchings on Trees and Applications
• Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
• Smoothed analysis of algorithms
• On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
• Plongements lipschitziens dans ${\bbfR}\sp n$
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
• Matching Theorems and Empirical Discrepancy Computations using Majorizing Measures
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
• Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
• Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing

This page was built for publication: Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings