Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
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Publication:2573267
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.006zbMath1115.91033OpenAlexW2083092421MaRDI QIDQ2573267
Publication date: 7 November 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.006
Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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Cites Work
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