Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
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Publication:2829693
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_20zbMath1348.91092OpenAlexW92672591MaRDI QIDQ2829693
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_20
Related Items (7)
The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ A family of distances for preference-approvals ⋮ Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules ⋮ An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
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