Forward induction reasoning revisited

DOI10.3982/TE598zbMath1235.91025OpenAlexW1550551258MaRDI QIDQ3119038

Amanda Friedenberg, Pierpaolo Battigalli

Publication date: 7 March 2012

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te598

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic game theoryforward inductionextensive form best response setextensive form games, directed rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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