scientific article

zbMath1231.91117MaRDI QIDQ3549687

Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden

Publication date: 5 January 2009

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (32)

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Efficient Money Burning in General Domains ⋮ Toss one's cake, and eat it too: partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting ⋮ Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation ⋮ On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design ⋮ Resource Burning for Permissionless Systems (Invited Paper) ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Reasoning about Quality and Fuzziness of Strategic Behaviors ⋮ What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers ⋮ Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders ⋮ Derandomization of auctions ⋮ Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter ⋮ Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design ⋮ Optimal crowdsourcing contests ⋮ Efficient money burning in general domains ⋮ Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design ⋮ Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare ⋮ From Monetary to Nonmonetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies ⋮ Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games ⋮ Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Revenue maximization with a single sample ⋮ Selling privacy at auction

This page was built for publication: