Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets

DOI10.2307/2298078zbMath0847.90038OpenAlexW2053860629MaRDI QIDQ4883970

Cheng Wang

Publication date: 13 October 1996

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ff3cf7a377290501312c3be8ae69d6e3fbd19fdb

zbMATH Keywords

Bellman equationbilateral asymmetric informationbalanced budgetsdynamic insurance problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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