The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
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Publication:5053687
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_4zbMath1502.91023MaRDI QIDQ5053687
Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, Mostapha Diss, Abdelmonaim Tlidi
Publication date: 6 December 2022
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_4
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