A Structural Model of Government Formation

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00389zbMath1184.91188OpenAlexW3126113343MaRDI QIDQ5476207

Daniel Diermeier, Antonio Merlo, Hülya Eraslan

Publication date: 29 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00389

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsbargaininggovernment formationpolitical stabilitycomparative constitutional designgovernment dissolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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