Composable and efficient mechanisms

DOI10.1145/2488608.2488635zbMath1293.91091arXiv1211.1325OpenAlexW2115276154MaRDI QIDQ5495791

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos

Publication date: 7 August 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.1325

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencysmoothnesscompositionmechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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