CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000417zbMath1134.91319OpenAlexW2167412942MaRDI QIDQ5694438

Laurence Kranich, Andrés Perea, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 30 September 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000417

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (27)

A dynamic game of waste management ⋮ Sustaining cooperation in a differential game of advertising goodwill accumulation ⋮ Dynamic cost allocation for economic lot sizing games ⋮ Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game ⋮ Stochastic bankruptcy games ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ Strategic transfers between cooperative games ⋮ Core concepts for incomplete market economies ⋮ Transferable utility games with uncertainty ⋮ Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games ⋮ Strongly Time-Consistent Core in Differential Games with Discrete Distribution of Random Time Horizon ⋮ Sequential stochastic core of a cooperative stochastic programming game ⋮ Confidence intervals for the Shapley-Shubik power index in Markovian games ⋮ On the regularization of a cooperative solution in a multistage game with random time horizon ⋮ The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games ⋮ A NOTE ON THE WEAK SEQUENTIAL CORE OF DYNAMIC TU GAMES ⋮ Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control ⋮ The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty ⋮ Dynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players ⋮ Robust dynamic cooperative games ⋮ The weak sequential core for two-period economies ⋮ An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes ⋮ Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective ⋮ AN OVERVIEW ON GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS TO ENGINEERING ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration ⋮ Deviations, uncertainty and the core ⋮ Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games

Cites Work

• The core of a monetary economy without trust
• Monotonicity of solutions in certain dynamic cooperative games
• A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
• The Recursive Core
• Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience
• The Core of an N Person Game

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