A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
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Publication:6156344
DOI10.1007/s10058-022-00292-9zbMath1518.91171MaRDI QIDQ6156344
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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