Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.07.009MaRDI QIDQ405532zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gilat Levy, Ronny Razin

Publication date 5 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

influence functionsdynamic decision makinglobbying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Agendas in legislative decision-making
• Lobbying and discretion

Cites work

• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Extremism drives out moderation
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• On the rule of \(k\) names
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Starting small and commitment
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

Cited in

(3)

• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions

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