Dynamic relational contracts under complete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.02.004MaRDI QIDQ1753710zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. P. Thomas, Tim Worrall

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/54672280/ThomasWorrallJET2018DynamicRelationalContracts.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

limited commitmentrelational contractsrisk sharingself-enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• The curse of long horizons
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem

Cites work

• Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage
• Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• Power fluctuations and political economy
• Random dynamical systems. Theory and applications
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Stochastic stability of monotone economies in regenerative environments
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements

Cited in

(12)

• Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• A theory of progressive lending
• Relational contracts and the first-order approach
• Partnership in a dynamic production system with unobservable actions and noncontractible output
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1984097 (Why is no real title available?)
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
• Monotone contracts
• Relational contracts: public versus private savings
• Starting small and commitment

This page was built for publication: Dynamic relational contracts under complete information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1753710)