Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
- Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives
- Contracting with Externalities
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
- Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships
- Game theory
- Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics
- On Forward Induction
- Optional fixed fees in multilateral vertical relations
- Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Signaling private choices
- The interaction between corporate tax structure and disclosure policy
- Transparency and economic policy
Cited in
(7)- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
- Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information
- Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
- Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games
- Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
- Information and targeted spending
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