Implementation via approval mechanisms
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Recommendations
- On the implementation of the median
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
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Cites work
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Handbook on approval voting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
Cited in
(7)- Strategic vote trading under complete information
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- On the implementation of the median
- Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
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