Participation in moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.11.005MaRDI QIDQ5964685zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guillaume Roger

Publication date 1 March 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2064&context=buspapers

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcontractmoral hazardparticipation constraintprincipal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72)

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Cites work

• A note on common agency models of moral hazard
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Arm's Length Relationships
• Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841893 (Why is no real title available?)
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
• On countervailing incentives
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(6)

• Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Early selection and moral hazard
• The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard
• PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM

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