The private value single item bisection auction

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0032-ZMaRDI QIDQ852323zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors N. E. Zubov

Publication date 29 November 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/5c973ca6-c1bb-41e5-afff-b6d300f2f88c

zbMATH Keywords

information revelationbinary searchEnglish auctionbisection auctionextensive form games of incomplete informationsingle item auctionVickrey auctionweakly dominant strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Auctioning divisible goods
• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
• Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
• The discrete bid first auction
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966906 (Why is no real title available?)
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Incentives in Teams
• Microeconomic theory

Cited in

(12)

• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• On communication protocols that compute almost privately
• The communication cost of selfishness
• Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets
• Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
• Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
• The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
• Asking questions
• A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
• On the fastest Vickrey algorithm
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• One man, one bid

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