Local and global consistency properties for student placement

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.03.002zbMath1280.91097OpenAlexW2098496847MaRDI QIDQ386062

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

Publication date: 13 December 2013

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyconverse consistencypriority structurestudent placement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems ⋮ Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems ⋮ Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case

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• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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