Application fee manipulations in matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.006zbMath1282.91229OpenAlexW2031240337MaRDI QIDQ393269

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 16 January 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingequilibriummanipulationapplication fee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ Graduate admission with financial support

Cites Work

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• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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