Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005zbMath1400.90148OpenAlexW2594658337MaRDI QIDQ523512

Youngsub Chun, Duygu Yengin

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ier.snu.ac.kr/activity/working-papers?md=download&seqidx=32

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessqueueing problem\(k\)-pivotal rules\(k\)-welfare lower boundidentical costs lower boundqueue-efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (6)

No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Egalitarianism in the queueing problem ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ No-envy in the Queueing Problem with Multiple Identical Machines

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