Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2004.08.003zbMath1127.91021OpenAlexW2062380052MaRDI QIDQ557955

Jun Wako

Publication date: 30 June 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Scarf economyCoalition-proof Nash equilibriumCommodity-wise competitive allocationIndivisible goodsSeparable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (7)

Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods ⋮ Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible ⋮ On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods ⋮ Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets ⋮ Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability

Cites Work

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• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

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