On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
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Publication:634516
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.001zbMATH Open1247.91058OpenAlexW1975693854MaRDI QIDQ634516FDOQ634516
Johanna M. M. Goertz, François Maniquet
Publication date: 16 August 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2009_26.pdf
Cites Work
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Large Poisson games
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
Cited In (21)
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Information aggregation with runoff voting
- A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
- Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
- (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
- How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
- Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
- Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
- Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
- Bargaining through approval
- Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
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