On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003zbMath1085.91003MaRDI QIDQ705862

Makoto Shimoji

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

Conditional dominance; Forward induction; Normal form information set; Rationalizability; Sequential best response; Weak dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A18: Games in extensive form

Related Items

On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games, The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology, Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings

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