Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90058-4zbMath0553.90012OpenAlexW4240028409MaRDI QIDQ759609

Zvi Ritz

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90058-4

zbMATH Keywords

social choicerestricted domainsnondictorial Arrow-type social welfare functionnonmanipulable and noncorruptible social choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model ⋮ Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules ⋮ Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

This page was built for publication: Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives