Testing guilt aversion

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.021zbMath1197.91071OpenAlexW2061757045WikidataQ57345084 ScholiaQ57345084MaRDI QIDQ844913

Sigve Tjøtta, Tore Ellingsen, Gaute Torsvik, Magnus Johannesson

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.021

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsexperimentsguilt aversiongenerosity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (29)

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Cites Work

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• The self-fulfilling property of trust: an experimental study
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
• "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
• Promises and Partnership

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