A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.006zbMath1202.91023MaRDI QIDQ848628

Bo Chen

Publication date: 4 March 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

repeated prisoner's dilemma; folk theorem; asymmetric private monitoring; belief-based approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

Cites Work

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