How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters

DOI10.1007/s10614-006-9040-8zbMath1161.91365OpenAlexW2022984943MaRDI QIDQ867681

Joern Dermietzel, Herbert Dawid

Publication date: 16 February 2007

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9040-8

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingevolutionary algorithmagent-based simulationNash demand gameequal-split norm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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