Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012zbMath1159.91356MaRDI QIDQ1017796

Eyal Winter, Hamid Sabourian, Parimal Kanti Bag

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rules; Condorcet consistency; Markov equilibrium; sequential elimination; multi-stage voting; top cycle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

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