The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
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Publication:1060661
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(85)90043-5zbMath0568.90006OpenAlexW1976060283MaRDI QIDQ1060661
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(85)90043-5
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Cites Work
- Integration over a simplex, truncated cubes, and Eulerian numbers
- Single-stage election procedures for large electorates
- Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
- Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
- An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
