Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(80)90021-XzbMath0427.90005OpenAlexW2015550751MaRDI QIDQ1136590

Thomas E. Armstrong

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(80)90021-x

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare functionsArrow's impossibility theoremBoolean algebra of measurable coalitionscontinuous preference profilesinvisible dictatorsmeasurable spaces of economic agentsnegligible coalitionssocial choices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (23)

Existence of nonatomic core-Walras allocations ⋮ Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions ⋮ Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population ⋮ Stable preference aggregation with infinite population ⋮ A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities ⋮ Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators ⋮ Games of bounded deviation, additivizations of games and asymptotic martingales ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?) ⋮ Superset-robust collective choice rules ⋮ Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games ⋮ On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions ⋮ Anonymity in large societies ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures ⋮ The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population ⋮ Ultraproducts and aggregation ⋮ The core-Walras equivalence ⋮ Limiting dictatorial rules ⋮ Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions

Cites Work

• A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• A decomposition of additive set functions
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