On the evolution of optimizing behavior

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90042-GzbMath0753.92018OpenAlexW4213418955MaRDI QIDQ1201144

Eddie Dekel, Suzanne Scotchmer

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90042-g

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicslearning processmixed strategiessurvival of the fittestpure strategiesnever-fittest strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items

Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia ⋮ Weight of fitness deviation governs strict physical chaos in replicator dynamics ⋮ Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics ⋮ Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria ⋮ Which misspecifications persist? ⋮ Colonial Competitive Algorithm as a Tool for Nash Equilibrium Point Achievement ⋮ Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. ⋮ A strategy optimization approach for mission deployment in distributed systems ⋮ The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics ⋮ On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics ⋮ Imitation and experimentation in changing contests ⋮ Learning in games by random sampling ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics ⋮ Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players ⋮ Economists' models of learning ⋮ On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia ⋮ Replicator equations induced by microscopic processes in nonoverlapping population playing bimatrix games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Three characterizations of population strategy stability
• Strategy stability in complex populations
• Evolutionary Games in Economics