Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2423zbMath0910.90271OpenAlexW2053213364MaRDI QIDQ1270755

K. Appert

Publication date: 19 April 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2423

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary modelnoisy pre-play communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Inventing new signals ⋮ On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests ⋮ Communication, risk, and efficiency in games ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Stability and trembles in extensive-form games ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games

Cites Work

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• Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
• Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
• Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Strategy stability in complex populations
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions