A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many

DOI10.1007/BF01737566zbMath0276.90069OpenAlexW3123237673MaRDI QIDQ1393354

Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 1973

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01737566

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

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