Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00114-5zbMath1059.91055MaRDI QIDQ1421881

I. R. Segal'

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

PotentialSupermodular gamesSimultaneous and sequential Cournot adjustment (tatônnement)Unique implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (14)

Bertrand competition under network externalities ⋮ The timing of contracting with externalities ⋮ Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart ⋮ Collective hold‐up ⋮ NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, DOMINANT VALUE MARGINS, AND EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS ⋮ Pay equality among heterogeneous agents ⋮ Combinatorial agency ⋮ Screening while controlling an externality ⋮ Exploiting social influence in networks ⋮ On discrimination in the optimal management of teams ⋮ Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities ⋮ Market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics ⋮ The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining ⋮ Optimal contracting in networks

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Potential games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• A Generalization of the Maximum Theorem
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Contracting with Externalities
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

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