Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
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Publication:1429915
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9zbMath1064.91023MaRDI QIDQ1429915
Publication date: 27 May 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00120-9
Language; Learning; Game theory; Evolution; Communication; Meaning; Cheap talk; Information transmission; Incentive alignment
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