Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.09.005zbMath1417.91230OpenAlexW1562618743WikidataQ129156454 ScholiaQ129156454MaRDI QIDQ1622456

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Daniele Condorelli

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21944/1/wc-JET-02-04-18.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

optimal auctionsweak cartelsweakly collusion-proof auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Credit auctions and bid caps

Cites Work

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• The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion^*

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