Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)

DOI10.1016/S0166-218X(99)00203-6zbMath0946.90033MaRDI QIDQ1975360

Mourad Baïou

Publication date: 30 October 2000

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcollege admissionsstable marriagemany-to-one matchingstable assignmenttwo-sided market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (36)

Student admissions and faculty recruitment ⋮ Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners ⋮ Blockers and antiblockers of stable matchings ⋮ The stable fixtures problem -- a many-to-many extension of stable roommates ⋮ The stable fixtures problem with payments ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ Matching and scheduling of student-company-talks for a university it-speed dating event ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Stable allocations and partially ordered sets ⋮ Friend of my friend: network formation with two-hop benefit ⋮ On Lattice and DA ⋮ On the stable \(b\)-matching polytope. ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Faster algorithms for stable allocation problems ⋮ An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings. ⋮ Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism ⋮ The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings ⋮ Equitable representation and recruitment ⋮ New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems ⋮ The Generalized Stable Allocation Problem ⋮ A note on many-to-many matchings and stable allocations ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions ⋮ The stable \(b\)-matching polytope revisited ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions ⋮ Stable multi-skill workforce assignments ⋮ Finding All Stable Pairs and Solutions to the Many-to-Many Stable Matching Problem ⋮ The diameter of the stable marriage polytope: bounding from below ⋮ Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences ⋮ The Stable Fixtures Problem with Payments ⋮ Agreement toward stability in matching markets ⋮ Monge Properties, Optimal Greedy Policies, and Policy Improvement for the Dynamic Stochastic Transportation Problem ⋮ Finding a minimum-regret many-to-many Stable Matching

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Graphs and Marriages
• Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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