Active linking in evolutionary games
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Publication:2202394
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.027zbMath1447.91025OpenAlexW2105053492WikidataQ42678840 ScholiaQ42678840MaRDI QIDQ2202394
Jorge M. Pacheco, Martin A. Nowak, Arne Traulsen
Publication date: 18 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc3279753
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