A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
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Publication:2338654
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.001zbMath1429.91147MaRDI QIDQ2338654
Publication date: 21 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.001
strategic voting; Euclidean preferences; dictatorial domains; top-connectedness; impossibility domain; possibility domain
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Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains, A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness, A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
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