Efficient lottery design

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0978-8zbMath1392.91130OpenAlexW2439595674MaRDI QIDQ2362194

Onur Kesten, Alexander S. Nesterov, Morimitsu Kurino

Publication date: 6 July 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107132

zbMATH Keywords

school choiceprobabilistic serial mechanismrandom serial dictatorshipindivisible goods allocationlottery design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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