On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.014zbMath1290.91067OpenAlexW2152236218MaRDI QIDQ2442845

Fei Li, Maciej H. Kotowski

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11718166

zbMATH Keywords

contestscommon valuesall-pay auctionwar of attritionbudget constraintsaffiliationprivate values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets ⋮ Resource inequality in the war of attrition ⋮ On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints ⋮ The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information ⋮ Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction

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