The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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Publication:2482637
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.009zbMath1133.91396MaRDI QIDQ2482637
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.009
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Cites Work
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