An experimental study of costly coordination
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Publication:2485486
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.006zbMath1099.91032WikidataQ59938136 ScholiaQ59938136MaRDI QIDQ2485486
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/5767/
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