Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.05.002zbMath1232.91534OpenAlexW2068262561MaRDI QIDQ2638313

Ismail Saglam, Ayşe Mumcu

Publication date: 15 September 2010

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoreexternalitiesone-to-one matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (12)

Matching with aggregate externalities ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability ⋮ Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Cites Work

• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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