Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_28zbMath1406.91253OpenAlexW2559816002MaRDI QIDQ2959847

Yehonatan Mizrahi, Liad Blumrosen

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_28

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral tradingBayes-Nash equilibriumgain-from-trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (7)

(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Cost sharing in two-sided markets ⋮ Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets ⋮ Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best ⋮ Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms ⋮ Improved approximation to first-best gains-from-trade ⋮ Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets

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• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
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• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

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