Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

From MaRDI portal
Revision as of 05:05, 7 March 2024 by Import240305080351 (talk | contribs) (Created automatically from import240305080351)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)

Publication:5758064

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7zbMath1193.91002OpenAlexW1562844845MaRDI QIDQ5758064

Peter Sudhölter, Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 7 September 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision Library (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7




Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Facets of the cone of exact gamesCharacterizations of weighted and equal division valuesVariance allocation and Shapley valueCollusion properties of coalition values for games in characteristic function formModeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player propertyThe Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approachThe kernel is in the least core for permutation gamesProperties of solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilitiesRemarks on a surplus-sharing rule from the Mishneh TorahToward the complexity of the existence of wonderfully stable partitions and strictly core stable coalition structures in enemy-oriented hedonic gamesFinding the nucleoli of large cooperative gamesHart-Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex gamesA cardinal convex game with empty coreVon Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proofAxiomatizing core extensions on NTU gamesConsistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-gamesThe balanced contributions property for equal contributorsShapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market gamesSharing loading costs for multi compartment vehiclesAxiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutionsProof systems and transformation gamesStable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU gamesControlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quotaConvex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-coreRandom reduction consistency of the Weber set, the core and the anti-coreThe prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structuresStable matching with network externalitiesOn an extension of the concept of TU-games and their valuesA generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete informationWeighted values and the core in NTU gamesThe non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form gameThe collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structuresCoincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covarianceThe intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber setCores of combined gamesAggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative gamesNonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolusMerging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility resultsNewsvendor games: convex optimization of centralized inventory operationsCooperative Markov decision processes: time consistency, greedy players satisfaction, and cooperation maintenanceCoalitional games: monotonicity and coreA characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)The bounded core for games with precedence constraintsNetwork bargaining: using approximate blocking sets to stabilize unstable instancesThe simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-gamePairwise mergers in bipartite matching games with an application in collaborative logisticsBargaining and membershipStable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side paymentsA strict partial order on payoff configurations and its some propertiesCompetitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market gamesA note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemesAnalyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weightsSharing the cost of redundant itemsResource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cuttingA bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto playersPreserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced gamesThe cone of supermodular games on finite distributive latticesThe core and the steady bargaining set for convex gamesOptimal deterrence of cooperationRevenue sharing for resource reallocation among project activity contractorsTrouble comes in threes: core stability in minimum cost connection networksThe unbinding core for coalitional form gamesThe kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licenseesProperties and comparison of risk capital allocation methodsPath-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic modelOn extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility gamesCharacterizations of highway toll pricing methodsA monotonic core solution for convex TU gamesPower indices of simple games and vector-weighted majority games by means of binary decision diagramsThe positive core of a cooperative gameDifference between the position value and the myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structuresMaximizing selections from the core of a cooperative gameAn axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment marketsFacets of the cone of totally balanced gamesThe central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional gamesServing many masters: an agent and his principalsRevenue sharing for resource transfer among projectsThe nucleolus of arborescence games in directed acyclic graphsSequential entry in many-to-one matching marketsAn analog of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem. I: The non-emptiness of the core of a fuzzy gameResource location gamesAxiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex gamesNontransferable utility bankruptcy gamesBargaining sets and the core in partitioning gamesGain-sharing in urban consolidation centersAn empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic gamesVoting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European UnionCooperative games with overlapping coalitions: charting the tractability frontierCores and optimal fuzzy communication structures of fuzzy gamesMonotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cuttingConsistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley valueObituary: Bezalel Peleg (1936--2019)Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping gameOptimal solutions for group matrix games involving interval-valued fuzzy numbersExistence of fuzzy prekernels and Mas-Colell bargaining sets in TU gamesStructural control in weighted voting gamesOn proper Shapley values for monotone TU-gamesA note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber setAutonomous coalitionsYoung's axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof






This page was built for publication: Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games